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Abstract 
Policy reforms to primary health care delivery in New Zealand required government-
funded firms overseeing care delivery to be constituted as nonprofit entities with governance 
shared between consumer and producers. This paper examines the consumer and producer 
interests in the allocation of ownership and control of New Zealand firms delivering primary 
health care utilising theories of competition in the markets for ownership and control of firms. 
Consistent with pre-reform patterns of ownership and control, provider interests appear to 
have exerted effective control over the formation and governance of the new entities in all but 
a few cases where community (consumer) control was already established.  Their ability to do 
so is implied from the absence of a defined ownership stake via which the balance of 
governance control could shift as consequence of changes to incentives facing the different 
stakeholding groups. It appears that the pre-existing patterns will prevail and further 
intervention will be required if policymakers are to achieve their underlying aims.   
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From Providers to PHOs: an institutional analysis of nonprofit 
primary health care governance in New Zealand 
 
Introduction 
The cost of health care is escalating and, while, since the end of World War II, 
governments have assumed increased responsibility for funding their citizen‟s health care 
(van Kemenade, 1997), the ability of nation states to fund increasing demands for health care 
is declining. In New Zealand, the government‟s health care spending has risen at a rate of 
5.1% per annum on a compound basis from 1996, with the overall health expenditure 
increasing from 7.3% of GDP in 1996 to 8.5% of GDP in 2004 (Ministry of Health, 2007), 
due in large part to increasing focus on primary health care from 2001.  However, the 
questions of who should receive the increased funds, and the optimal institutional structures 
to manage them, are vexed.   
Health care delivery markets
1
 worldwide are characterised by the presence of many 
firms constituted in forms other than the classic shareholder-owned firm, so as to reduce the 
inherent moral hazard that would restrict access to health care, and information asymmetry 
that would increase health care costs.  Yet, absent legislative or contractual prohibitions, these 
firms typically co-exist and compete with classic shareholder-owned firms (Brown, 2010).  
This suggests that whilst alternatively-constituted firms may offer advantages in certain 
circumstances, it is not axiomatic that such structures and their attendant advantages are 
generalisable across an entire market or industry sector.    
Nonetheless, some government funders have signalled strict preferences for nonprofit 
firms to provide health care as a means of ensuring value for money from increased spending. 
For example, in the New Zealand Primary Health Care Strategy (NZPHCS), government 
funding is restricted to newly-created geographically-defined Primary Health Organisations 
(PHOs) which are required to demonstrate a nonprofit objective (Minister of Health, 2001).
2
  
The justification for nonprofit firms “to guard against public funds being diverted from health 
gain and health services to shareholder dividends” (Minister of Health, 2001:14) derives from 
the „trust‟ that theoretically can be placed in these firms because they have no owners whose 
incentives might lead them to act contrarily to the interests of the funder or patient. 
In practice, however, all firms operate as a nexus of relationships between a variety of 
ownership and control interests (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1985) which generates ultimately 
                                                     
1 The authors acknowledge that the wider health care sector embodies the nexus of markets for health care delivery and markets 
for the provision of risk management (insurance – either privately or socially provided – see Howell, 2005).  However, for the 
purposes of this paper, we have chosen to address only those aspects relating to the exchange of products and services in the 
health care delivery markets – that is, care transactions between patients and service providers.   
2 In turn PHOs have entered into contracts for service provision with a vast range of service providers, including community and 
charitable trusts, indigenous (Maori) incorporations and trades unions, and independent practitioners associations (IPAs), as well 
as traditional privately-owned for-profit firms (usually General Practitioner clinics – GPs) (Howell, 2005a).  
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the firm‟s residual asset value and future income streams (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992).  A 
nonprofit objective, operationalised in the „nondistribution constraint‟ preventing defined 
owners appropriating excessive profits at the expense of other stakeholders (James & Rose-
Ackerman, 1986), speaks only to the matter of distributing income streams (profits)
3
.  The 
nondistribution constraint is silent on the matter of who controls decisionmaking in respect of 
the assets used to generate those income streams, or how any income acquired will be applied 
in the absence of shareholders to whom it would otherwise be distributed as either dividends 
or increased equity.  The constraint cannot, for example, preclude the distribution of surpluses 
via higher salaries paid to employees who, absent the restrictions, would have appropriated 
the same surpluses as owners (Robinson, Jakubowski & Figueras, 2005; Howell, 2006).  The 
allocation of decisionmaking control rights is thus likely to be at least equally, if not more 
important to the efficient operation of the firm and the achievement of the government‟s 
distributional objectives than simply the presence or absence of defined shareholding interests 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama & Jensen 1983a, 1983b).  
This paper utilises an industrial organisation framework derived from Hansmann‟s 
(1996) theories of competition in the markets for ownership and control of firms, to evaluate 
the allocation of ownership and control (governance) of firms delivering primary health care.  
In addition to addressing the economic case for these firms having owners or not, it addresses 
the circumstances in which control (either in the form of shareholdings, or the exercise of 
governance control in a nonowned firm) is optimally exercised by service provider or 
consumer interests.  By way of case studies, the primary health care sectors in New Zealand 
both prior to and after the implementation of the NZPHCS are analyzed to explain the 
consequences of the allocation of PHO control rights between consumer and service provider 
interests, and how these allocations have influenced the formation and governance of the 
newly-created nonprofit PHOs.   
We contend that, despite the New Zealand government‟s intentions to establish 
nonprofit PHOs with governance shared between provider and community (consumer) 
interests, the high costs of ownership under this model have resulted in a market for control of 
new nonprofit PHOs that has largely followed the patterns of health care provider ownership 
and control established prior to the NZPHCS implementation when the ownership form of 
firms receiving government funding were not limited.  The Hansmann (1996) framework is 
borne out as provider interests appear to have effectively controlled the formation of PHOs 
and by extension primary health care service delivery in all but a few cases where community 
control pre-existed.  We further suggest that this pattern is likely to continue until exogenous 
                                                     
3 That is, the „ownership‟ component of Berle & Means‟ (1932) classic separation of „ownership‟ and „control. 
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economic and/or environmental disruptions indicate that optimal control of service delivery 
should shift from provider to consumer interests.   
The paper proceeds as follows; section one develops the theoretical framework, with 
section two applying the framework to the general case of primary health care ownership and 
governance.  In sections three and four the New Zealand primary health care market is 
examined respectively prior to and following the implementation of the NZPHCS.  Section 
five concludes with discussion and recommendations for further research.  
 
1. An Industrial Organisation View of Nonprofit Health Care Delivery Firms 
Ever since Kenneth Arrow (1963) articulated the advantages of a nonprofit objective 
in reducing inefficiencies arising in the markets for medical care, there has been great interest 
in the contribution of firms adopting forms other than the standard shareholder-owned model.  
The form most analysed is the classic „nonprofit‟ with no owners and where the non-
distribution constraint is held to militate against the risks associated with defined owners 
appropriating excessive profits at the expense of other stakeholders (James & Rose-
Ackerman, 1986; Silverbo, 2004). However, attention has also been given to firms which, 
although having defined owners, might be constrained by either an explicit objective 
eschewing the pursuit of profits as the primary motivation (Glaeser & Shleifer, 2001) or 
reliance upon the owners‟ personal altruistic motivations to counter the pursuit of profits in 
excess of reasonable costs of service provision (Besley & Ghatak, 2005; Lakdawallah & 
Philipson, 2006)
4
 .   
 
1.1 Rationale 
Two rationales are commonly offered for the observed prevalence of nonprofit firms
5
 
in the health sector.  The first is to ensure the provision of „third sector‟ or „public good‟ 
services, which would not otherwise be offered by (or would be under-supplied by) for-profit 
or government entities (e.g. Weisbrod, 1975; 1988).  Arguably, this justification accounts for 
the nonprofit provision of goods for which there is a „missing market‟ – for example ensuring 
that in monopolistically competitive markets
6
 product variants are offered that cater to the 
differentiated demands of special interest groups (such as ethnic communities, religious 
groups or other such associated patient collectives).  The second rationale is the presence of 
                                                     
4 Nonprofit firms may have defined shareholders or be „unowned‟ – that is, where there are no defined owners with a claim on 
residual assets or income streams, and where all control rights regarding the application of the assets and income streams are 
vested in a governing body bound principally by adherence to fiduciary duties  (Fama & Jensen, 1986; 1986a).   
5 For a fuller discussion of the modelling of nonprofit institutional structures and behaviours, see Hughes & Luksetich (2010).  
6 The market for medical care – and in particular, primary health care services – is widely presumed to exhibit monopolistically 
competitive characteristics as a consequence of both the repeated interaction that occurs between a patient and a primary health 
care practitioner and the high search costs incurred by patients in finding a practitioner whose differentiated service provision  
characteristics offer the best match for that specific patient (Dranove & Satterthwaite, 2000).  
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information asymmetries between service purchasers (either patients or third-party donors and 
insurers) and health care providers (Arrow, 1963; Newhouse, 1973; Rose-Ackerman, 1996).  
Whilst the asymmetry leads in the first instance to underprovision (arguably a „missing 
market‟ as per rationale one), it also predisposes beneficiaries to risks of exploitation by more 
knowledgeable parties (usually service providers) that are not always easily ameliorated by 
contractual or regulatory constraints (Williamson, 1985; Hansmann, 1980). By signalling that 
the firm has no explicit profit-maximising objective, or that in the event that profits are made, 
the surpluses cannot be appropriated by specific individuals but will instead be distributed via 
the firm‟s operations (e.g. as services to beneficiaries), the firm has assured stakeholders that 
they can „trust‟ that they will not be exploited financially as a result of the firm‟s information 
advantages. 
 In the Structure-Conduct-Performance view of industrial organisation (Mason, 1939, 
1949; Bain, 1959), it is essentially a matter of strategic choice whether a firm will be 
constituted in a shareholder-owned, for-profit form or as a nonprofit.  This view asserts an 
optimal structure both for the firms and the sector, that once established will lead to desired 
behaviours and consequently the most efficient sector outcomes.  Government policy and 
legislative force can be utilised to ensure that socially optimal structures are imposed 
exogenously so that the desired outcomes will ensue.  By contrast, however, the Price Theory 
view (Coase, 1937; Stigler, 1968; Williamson, 1975) holds that the economic incentives 
facing individuals and firms explain market phenomena such as the organisational structure of 
a firm and the interactions occurring in a market. In this view, a firm‟s institutional structure 
(design and governance arrangements), the nature of its objective function(s), and the identity 
of its shareholders (including having none – that is, a classic „non-owned‟ firm) are 
determined endogenously.  If an opportunity exists for a party to be better off as a 
consequence of a change in the prevailing arrangements, then the ensuing interactions in the 
markets for both ownership (where possible) and control will gravitate towards securing that 
outcome. 
 
1.2 Markets for (Non)Ownership and Control 
Using Price Theory precepts, Hansmann (1996) contends that absent restrictions, 
markets for the ownership and control of firms will result in a firm being owned by the group 
of stakeholders whose ownership results in the least combined costs of ownership and market 
contracting.  The costs of „ownership‟ include the costs of co-ordinating (e.g. communicating 
with shareholders, making decisions) and motivating (e.g. ensuring management runs the firm 
efficiently; using incentives; avoiding losses from imperfect agency relationships).  Market 
contracting costs include transaction costs, costs of market power imbalances (including those 
arising from information asymmetries), contractual incompleteness, bounded rationality and 
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contractual hold-up costs (Williamson, 1985). Hansmann classifies stakeholders as either 
suppliers to the firm (including suppliers of raw materials, labour and finance – both equity 
(shareholders) and debt) or its customers.  He uses his theories to explain why, for example, 
dairy farmers (suppliers) have tended to own downstream processing activities (dairy 
factories), whereas consumers have tended to own insurance companies (particularly via the 
„mutual‟ ownership instrument), and the firms supplying consumer goods in small-scale 
markets.  Hansmann‟s theories also serve to explain why optimal ownership changes in 
response to changes in the environment in which the firm operates.  For example, better 
regulation and information availability gradually enabled third party (capital) suppliers to 
compete in the markets for ownership of insurance companies, leading to widespread 
demutualisation in the 1980s.    
Hansmann further suggests that „non-owned‟ firms (i.e. with no defined shareholders) 
will emerge endogenously when the costs of maintaining defined ownership stakes outweigh 
the benefits.  In these circumstances, the costs are least when the controls and disciplines 
typically applied by shareholder-owners (whether of supplier or customer disposition) on the 
directors and managers of the firm are substituted with a set of fiduciary obligations.  These 
fiduciary requirements will specify, in lieu of shareholders, in whose interests the assets of the 
firm will be applied and how the revenues derived will be utilised.  Accordingly, if the firm 
would otherwise have been owned by suppliers (e.g. doctors, nurses), the fiduciary duties 
could be expected to reflect supplier beneficial interests.  Alternatively, if the ownership 
interests would otherwise have been vested in consumers (e.g. patients) then the fiduciary 
duties could be expected to reflect consumer beneficial interests.    
 
1.3 The NZPHCS Environment 
By invoking the „trust‟ arguments in support of the ex ante specification that PHOs 
must be nonprofit entities, the NZPHCS design appears to be underpinned by the „Structure-
Conduct-Performance‟ view of institutional design.  However, the policy was implemented in 
an environment where primary health care firms across the entire spectrum from shareholder-
owned for profit to unowned nonprofit already interacted (Crampton, 1999; Coster & 
Gribben, 1999). 
  The Price Theory view would suggest that the plurality of ownership forms pre-
existing the NZPHCS was a function of heterogeneity on all of patient and service provision 
preferences and economic circumstances in specific sub-markets.  Firm ownership and 
fiduciary interests would reflect not just the trading off of the relevant costs and benefits, but 
also the identity of the stakeholding group(s) (i.e. suppliers or consumers) whose control of 
the firm rendered the least costly institutional arrangements.   
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By mandating that PHOs have both a nonprofit objective and decisionmaking 
processes incorporating both supplier and consumer interests, the NZPHCS appears to be 
prescribing a single set of artificial ownership and governance obligations on PHOs that by 
the Price Theory view would be unlikely to emerge endogenously.  If these arrangements are 
not consistent with the minimisation of the joint costs of ownership and market contracting, 
then it would be expected that the governance arrangements of PHOs will evolve in such a 
manner as to minimise ownership and market contracting costs within the new policy 
constraints.  If there are compelling cost-based reasons why one stakeholder group should be 
the beneficial owners of a PHO, then regardless of the nonprofit objective or the imposition of 
a nondistribution constraint, it would be expected that the arrangements actually employed 
will ultimately reflect those interests. Although the firm may masquerade externally as an 
NZPHCS-compliant PHO (albeit at some additional cost of ownership and governance), its 
underlying activities will likely reflect the otherwise-lower cost ownership interests.   
. 
2. Primary Health Care: Who Will Own and Govern?   
This section uses an analysis of the costs of ownership and market contracting to 
examine the case for either consumers or service providers to own the firms delivering 
primary health care.  It also examines the circumstances where it might be economically most 
efficient for ownership interests to be foregone.  
 
2.1 Why enter into Patient (Consumer) Ownership? 
2.1.1 Costs of Market Contracting 
The predominant market contracting reason for consumers to own the firms providing 
primary health care pertains to the moral hazard that ownership by other interests present. 
Service providers can utilise their superior information (or other factors conferring market 
power, such as limited competition) for personal pecuniary gain – for example by 
overcharging patients for services or recommending unnecessary procedures (the moral 
hazard of „supplier-induced demand‟ – Pauly, 1968). To the extent that these risks cannot be 
adequately controlled by other mechanisms (e.g. regulation, registration requirements, etc.), 
patient ownership, where service providers are hired as employees by consumer-owners, 
potentially overcomes the overcharging problem. Patient-owners can set the prices they will 
charge to themselves as consumers to reflect the actual costs of the services provided. The 
incentive to overcharge is mitigated, as any proceeds raised in fees in excess of costs will 
simply be paid to the patient-owners as dividends. By granting the patients the power of 
employer in a contractual relationship with service providers, patient ownership also 
potentially addresses the risks of „supplier-induced demand‟.  Providing sufficient 
information is available to detect its occurrence, patient-owners can discipline employee-
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practitioners who engage in such behaviour
7
.  Furthermore, patient-employers can design 
employee remuneration contracts in order to reduce the likelihood of such behaviour 
occurring (e.g. utilising performance incentives that share the risk of opportunism with 
employee-providers – Robinson, 2001). 
 
2.1.2 Costs of Ownership 
With regard to the costs of ownership, patients may be the optimal (indeed, default) 
owners of a primary health care firm when the risks of ownership are too high for the 
alternative owners (i.e. service providers) to be willing to commit the capital (both physical 
and human) required to the firm (i.e. there is a „missing market‟ for practitioner ownership).  
Such risks may arise because demand for health care in a given locality is either too small or 
too uncertain to induce practitioners to invest in firm ownership (given that they likely face 
less risky ownership options offering more certain or higher returns on their human and 
physical capital in other localities).   
In order to ensure that any primary health care is provided in that locality, consumers 
(or their agents) must undertake the risks of firm ownership.  Under these arrangements, 
practitioners are usually hired on a salaried basis (thereby reducing supplier uncertainty), but 
to offset higher risks, either fees charged to patients must be higher than in other practices, or 
operating shortfalls must be procured from other sources – for example, other sources of 
consumer capital, such as philanthropic donations, fundraising or subsidies from other 
consumer-owned and governed activities (e.g. taxation).  Whilst ownership might be assumed 
in these circumstances by individuals who are not strictly themselves patients of the firm, it is 
important to note that any third-party engagement arises because those parties are giving 
effect to what would otherwise be consumer ownership of the firm, if only the consumers 
themselves could afford to assume the risks. Thus, the balance of governance interests in this 
case should lie with patients – because they are ultimately bearing the financial risks 
associated with the firm – rather than practitioners – who, having assumed the ownership risk-
free status of salaried employees, have effectively signalled their aversion to bearing the 
financial risks of ownership.   
 
2.1.3 Which Patient-Owners? 
 When individual patients have defined shareholdings, with a specified claim on all of 
residual assets, income streams and control, such an arrangement constitutes a classic 
shareholder-owned firm.  It now matters which patients will own the firm – a subset or all 
patients jointly.  Assuming only a subset of patients own the firm, then a risk exists that the 
                                                     
7 It is acknowledged that it may be difficult to detect such behaviour. 
 -10-  
patient-owners will overcharge the other patients. If all patients jointly and equally own the 
firm, then the risk of exploitation disappears as the benefits can be shared equally.  However, 
it also matters how that ownership stake is formalised.  If each consumer owns a defined 
share of the assets and income streams (profits distributed as dividends) independent of 
trading activity with the firm (as in a standard for-profit firm), then owners consuming fewer 
services will have an incentive to charge those consuming more services higher fees in order 
to enjoy a higher dividend.   
The equity required by primary health care firms is likely to be very small (premises 
can be leased and the typical practice equipment is, unlike specialist clinics and hospitals, not 
high-cost) when the patients‟ interest in the firm is as consumers, the most appropriate metric 
via which to define their ownership interests is from their custom rather than an equity stake.  
That is, the firm may have its least cost of ownership when established as a classic consumer-
controlled co-operative.  In a co-operative, all patients share equally in the governance of the 
firm, but any surpluses are distributed back to patients in proportion to their custom. The 
incentive to manipulate fees for personal gain is obviated – if fees above the cost of 
production are charged, the resulting profits are simply returned to precisely the same 
individuals who paid them in the first place (Hardesty & Salgia, 2004; Evans & Meade, 
2006).  Those who contribute most to the surpluses receive the greatest benefit (or if the 
benefit is distributed in the form of discounted fees, those consuming most services enjoy the 
greatest savings) whereas if surpluses were shared equally, healthier patients might be 
construed as profiting from the misfortunes of the sick. 
Consumer-controlled co-operatives often emerge endogenously when customers face 
high costs of market contracting with a powerful supplier (e.g. groceries and farm supplies in 
rural locations).  Such arrangements are especially likely to appeal in health care provision 
(relative to equal shareholding) as they also satisfy many social equity concerns.   The merits 
of the co-operative form are evident from their endogenous emergence in the health care 
sector. Early examples include the Friendly Societies of the 18
th
 and 19
th
 century, elementary 
insurance funds such as Blue Cross, and Kaiser Permanente‟s elementary managed care plan 
(Birchall, 1997, 1998) (albeit that these organisations were engaged in both the funding of 
care and its delivery).  Modern examples include trades and student union-owned clinics 
serving members who pay the costs of health care by a combination of regular membership 
dues and fees paid when services are actually consumed.   
The literature on co-operatives notes that they are most likely to offer lower costs of 
ownership when the consumer-owners are relatively homogeneous in their demands for the 
product or are already closely linked for other purposes (Hendrikse, 2004).  Demand 
homogeneity means lower likelihood of costly disputes over how the co-operative should be 
governed and managed.   If the consumer-owners are already linked via other interests, then 
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the costs of governing the new firm are likely to benefit from economies of scale and scope 
with other activities.  This provides a powerful explanation for the endogenous emergence of 
such co-operatives amongst worker unions and other extant organisations, such as rural and 
indigenous communities (such as Marae
8
 and Iwi
9
 Authorities in New Zealand), who are 
likely also engaged in co-operative ownership and management of a range of community 
facilities.  
The greater the heterogeneity of the patient base, and/or in the absence of any existing 
entities under which to operate a patient-controlled co-operative, the more likely it is that the 
costs of co-ordinating governance and other decision-making will  be high, thereby  reducing 
the relative advantages of patient ownership over supplier-owned forms.  In these instances, if 
patient ownership and control are still desirable, it may be most cost-effective for the 
individual patients to forgo a direct control interest in the firm and allow it to be constituted as 
one of Hansmann‟s non-owned firms (for example, as a Charitable Trust) (albeit that the 
lower co-ordination costs are achieved at the expense of higher costs of countering 
managerial opportunism – Milgrom & Roberts, 1992).  
The non-owned firm is the form most likely to be observed where the costs and risks 
of ownership are so high that neither provider-owned firms nor consumer-controlled co-
operatives emerge.  It is noted that there are also strategic advantages in the non-owned form 
in the case where there is a „missing market‟ for other ownership forms as it enables the 
trustees to access philanthropic (charitable) donations and tax concessions in order to meet the 
(necessarily) higher costs of service provision in such circumstances (Rose-Ackerman, 1986).  
However, the fiduciary duties of the governors of such firms would be expected to be aligned 
directly with those of patients as, but for the high costs of ownership, patients would have 
been the logical owners of the firm.  It is noted that in these circumstances, it is usually 
patients and patient-agents who assume the responsibility for (and personal costs of) raising 
funds to meet shortfalls.  
 
2.1.4 Summary: Patient Ownership 
 In summary, therefore, if the combined costs of ownership and market contracting 
lead to the conclusion that patients are the most efficient owners of primary health care firms, 
then this will most likely be manifested as either a patient-controlled co-operative where all 
patients share equally in the governance of the firm. Alternatively these will form as a classic 
non-owned nonprofit firm where the balance of governance responsibilities, reflected in the 
fiduciary duties binding those exerting control of the firm, favours patients interests. 
                                                     
8 The Marae, is Mäori for the communal meeting area and also has great spiritual significance.  
9 Mäori for tribe 
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2.2 Why enter into Service Provider (Supplier) Ownership? 
 If service providers own a primary health care firm, it would be in their capacity as 
either the suppliers of physical capital in the first instance or health professionals as suppliers 
of human capital in the second instance.   
 
2.2.1 Service Providers Own and Supply Costly-to-Contract Human Capital 
Firms tend to be owned by the suppliers of physical capital (financiers or professional 
investors such as insurance and superannuation funds) when the physical capital requirements 
are very much larger than can be supplied by either customers or suppliers of other production 
inputs (e.g labour, input commodities). Examples include electricity generators and 
telecommunications firms.  By contrast, in primary health care, as noted, the demands for 
physical capital are very small - premises are typically not highly customised so are generally 
leased, and the „tools of trade‟ (e.g. autoclaves, stethoscopes, scales, computers) are 
comparatively low-cost and non-specific compared to those required for hospital care delivery 
(e.g. radiotherapy treatment machines, MRI scanners, complex operating theatre equipment).  
Hence investor ownership of primary health care firms based upon physical capital needs is 
uncommon
10
.   
Rather, if suppliers are to own the firm, it is most likely to be in their capacity as 
suppliers of human capital essential to the firm‟s activities.  Practitioners must invest large 
amounts in developing their stock of human capital (education, training and experience).  This 
investment is a prerequisite for entering into the business, and is sunk (i.e. cannot be 
recovered once made).  In addition, the requisite human capital is both highly specific to the 
business of delivering primary health care (i.e. cannot easily be deployed into the provision of 
other services or at least not for a comparable return on the investment made), and therefore 
subject to hold-up. Hold-up occurs when, under a contractual arrangement (e.g. hiring an 
employee), the supplying party has some market power and may use threat of breach (e.g. 
withholding services) to extract from owners rents above a fair price for its acquisition).  
Furthermore, the one-to-one practitioner-to-patient nature of care delivery and the 
consumption of the good as part of its provision makes third-party (employer) monitoring of 
the level of effort exerted/quality delivered either very difficult or extremely costly for a 
third-party owner (Newhouse, 1973).   
 Together, the hold-up risks and monitoring costs render practitioner human capital 
essentially non-contractible (or at least very costly to contract for), so by Hansmann‟s 
                                                     
10 Arguably costs may be increasing as more complex diagnostic and treatment services are provided in community locations.  
However, it is not clear that even in these circumstances it is GP clinics that invest in such equipment – rather it tends to be 
specialist firms providing services to GPs and their clients who invest in these activities.   
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theories, the joint costs of ownership and market contracting will likely be least when the 
owner of the requisite human capital (the practitioner – doctor, midwife, nurse-practitioner 
etc) owns the firm.   This appears to be confirmed by market evidence.  Privately-owned 
primary health care firms are almost exclusively practitioner-owned, typically by a sole 
practitioner (Dranove & Satterthwaite, 2000; Scott, 2000).  
 
2.2.2 Partnership: Militating Risks of Market Contracting, Increasing Ownership 
Costs 
As the need for physical capital is small, there is no obvious equity-related reason 
why primary health care firms would comprise more than one practitioner.  Indeed, quite 
often a „group practice‟ is simply a convenient arrangement whereby sole practitioners jointly 
share common practice overheads such as premises, administration, and other services, but 
still trade under their own legally separate business identities (e.g. individual patient lists, 
separate tax registration)
11
. Indeed, legal partnership may increase risks arising from factors 
such as malpractice suits (Danzon, 1997). Equity-sharing (jointly-owned) primary health care 
practices could thus be expected to arise only when the consequences of market contracting 
increase financial risks to sole practitioners, necessitating merging of individual businesses as 
a means of pooling the risks facing each individual practitioner.  Such mergers will occur 
when the costs associated with managing the risks individually exceed the losses arising from 
imperfect contracts between the various owners as partners.   
Financial risks to practice income are greater when the practitioners are remunerated 
under capitation contracts than under fee-for-service contracts
12
 (Dranove, Simon & White, 
2002). Income streams are more variable under capitation than fee-for-service as demand and 
the hence intensity of effort required to service that varies in both timing and care intensity 
but income does not (Robinson, 2001).  Practice mergers enable losses incurred by 
practitioners whose patients demand more care or more intensive care than they are 
remunerated for to be offset by the surpluses earned by practitioners whose patients demand 
less, or less intensive, care than the firm is remunerated for.   
However, as each practitioner‟s activities are imperfectly monitored by others in the 
practice, the practitioner in an equity-sharing practice may exert less effort in that 
organisation than when working on his own account (due to moral hazard – Newhouse, 1973; 
Pauly, 1970; Zeckhauser, 1979).  All else held equal, equity-sharing partnerships therefore 
tend to be less productively efficient than sole practices, so the gains from better risk-bearing 
                                                     
11 It is noted that other professionals with similar  physical and human capital and sunk cost profiles and hard-to-monitor-and-
verify single client service delivery also use this same trading model – for example independent barristers operating in 
„chambers‟.   
12 Under capitation, firms are paid a fixed amount on an annualised basis to supply primary health care services to the patients 
under their care. This does not stop them from also charging patients a „top-up‟fee. Whereas under a fee-for-service arrangement, 
patient visits to a health professional are subsidised by the purchaser making a fixed payment to the provider for each visit. 
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arrangements in the merged firm must outweigh the lost productivity for the change in 
ownership form to be economically justified.    
 
2.2.3 Is Supplier-Controlled ‘Non-Ownership’ Ever Optimal? 
As primary health care firms having defined supplier ownership stakes appears to be 
the norm, it begs the question when it might be conceivable that the costs of supplier 
ownership are so great as to warrant foregoing it in favour of a nonprofit firm with fiduciary 
duties constructed so as to reflect the interests of the otherwise optimal supplier-owners.  
Whilst it is not uncommon for practitioners delivering hospital care to merge and form 
nonprofit firms in order to induce philanthropic donations of costly physical capital
13
, the 
same does not appear to apply to primary health care, principally because the physical capital 
needs are so small.  Furthermore, the argument that having many owners makes it 
prohibitively costly to maintain individual ownership interests likewise does not seem to 
apply to primary health care, given the economic characteristics trend strongly in favour of 
sole practitioner ownership.  Whilst capitation funding might increase practice risk, leading to 
increased merger activity, even at full capitation (i.e. all market trading risks borne by the 
practitioners) in the United States context at least, it appears feasible for practices of around 
25 primary health care practitioners to adequately manage the variations in patient demand 
(Hagen, 1999).  It does not seem plausible that the costs of co-ordinating and motivating such 
a small number of practitioners would substantially outweigh the large counterfactual benefits 
of maintaining an ownership stake
14
.   
The one exception borne out in the evidence appears to be the historic delivery of 
community-based care by religious charities and missions, where the care deliverers were 
themselves members of the religious or charitable order.  To all intents and purposes, the 
philanthropic donations made to their supporting bodies were to finance the care deliverers in 
the first instance (such posts were often termed „livings‟, reinforcing the conclusion that 
funding the deliverer‟s existence was the highest priority). The fiduciary duties of these 
organisations were focused strongly upon the interests of the care deliverers (indeed, 
„missionaries‟ were often appointed as board members as well as managers of the firm, and 
many worked in isolation from colleagues with near total control over their time and 
resources made available).  Moreover, unlike the consumer-beneficiaries of nonprofit firms 
                                                     
13 It is noted that philanthropic donations to practitioner-controlled nonprofit hospitals are almost always solicited and provided 
with the intention of benefiting practitioners in the first instance (e.g. the ability to perform a high-technology procedure (and in 
the case of a fee-paying system, charge fees accordingly) with patient benefits typically accruing as a secondary consideration. If 
there was a primary benefit to patients, either they or their insurers would be willing to pay fees reflecting the opportunity cost of 
the providers purchasing the equipment and providing services under commercial terms satisfactory to the providers of debt 
finance. Not surprisingly, such donations are typically made to teaching and research hospitals (Sloan, 2000).  
14 This would appear to be the case only if the effort exerted under joint ownership is very substantially smaller than the effort 
exerted under the ownership counterfactual, and that non-ownership of itself will overcome almost all of the reduction in effort 
exerted  – an unlikely scenario in practice.   
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and consumer co-operatives described above, the patients of the supplier-controlled firms had 
no genuine role as consumers in care delivery transactions – rather they were seen as 
subservient beneficiaries of charity care controlled and dispensed by the suppliers of that care 
in a manner that primarily satisfied the deliverers‟ objectives (e.g. religious conversion).  Few 
examples of this form of care delivery entity survive in the modern world due to a move away 
from philanthropic paternalism (Salamon, 1995) (although it has been argued that some 
charitable care delivered in third-world countries may still be motivated more by the need to 
satisfy the deliverer‟s sensitivities than the recipients‟ needs and preferences).   
 
2.2.4 Provider Ownership Summary 
In summary, therefore, it would appear that holding all other factors constant, if 
suppliers are to own primary health care firms, it will most likely be as sole practitioners.  
Whilst contractual remuneration forms and increasing capital requirements as more complex 
services are devolved from hospital and specialist care to community-based providers may 
encourage mergers to occur, it is most likely that the economic considerations encompassing 
the combined costs of ownership and market contracting mean that the firms will likely 
remain small and predominantly practitioner-owned.  
2.3 ‘Mixed’ Ownership and Governance 
As discussed in section four, the NZPHCS proscribes a governance model whereby 
control of PHOs is shared between practitioners and patients. Therefore, it begs the question 
of whether it would ever be economically optimal for consumer and practitioner interests to 
own the firm jointly, and to replace all defined ownership interests with fiduciary duties.  
Joint ownership typically tends to emerge as a solution to either substantial future 
uncertainty leading to risks that are not possible to anticipate and assign contractually (e.g. 
joint ventures for exploration and research and development), or mutual holdup of essential 
resources that, again, is not amenable to resolution by contract (this occurs in, for example, 
coal mines, railways and coal-fired electricity plants).  Whilst it is acknowledged that there 
may be risk of hold-up of human capital by suppliers (market contracting costs), which could 
be ameliorated by customer integration into ownership, it is not clear what resource could be 
mutually held up, except for the case of monopsony purchase by (for example) government 
funders. Although such a situation might be resolved by mutual ownership, it is not clear why 
this outcome would be necessarily superior to contractual resolution. As the human capital 
which is the subject of supplier hold-up poses contractual difficulties in any case, it may not 
matter whether it is within the firm or outside of it, as at some stage, the issue of remuneration 
for services provided must be addressed.  Indeed, internalising the negotiations may lead to 
even greater tensions due to the increased heterogeneity of interests posed by having both 
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consumer and supplier interests involved.  The outcome is likely to be increased costs of 
ownership, without necessarily reducing the costs of contracting human capital which still 
must be addressed.  Indeed, internalising the tensions within the firm may reduce the firm‟s 
ability to use competitive market mechanisms to differentiate suppliers of human capital, 
exposing the firm to even greater risks of holdup and board capture occurring.   
For these reasons, it would be highly unusual to see such a „mixed‟ ownership 
arrangement emerging endogenously.  Whilst the joint ownership of facilities is often 
observed (e.g. joint governance of hospital facilities or health clinics), the contracts for 
service provision tend to remain external to the operation of the facilities – either under 
employment or other arms-length contracts.   
A potential caveat arises, however, when the entity engages in the subcontracted 
purchase of services for patients rather than, or in addition to, delivering them directly.  If the 
only role for the firm is one of purchase, with no supply involved, then the firm is not a 
service provider but more properly a purchaser.  Shared control of a purchasing entity 
between the patients for whom the services are purchased and the very providers from whom 
they will be purchased (who already possess information advantages over customers) would 
appear to invoke such a severe conflict of interest that the arrangement appears untenable.  
Consumer interests would likely seek to obtain full control of the purchasing entity and 
engage in arms-length purchase agreements with the relevant providers.  If, however, the role 
was predominantly one of provision, it begs the question of what additional value mixed 
control might offer. If there was no tangible benefit from engaging consumer interests, then 
provider interests would prevail - as indicated in the preceding subsections where primary 
health care delivery firms are almost always owned by provider interests.   
This logic tends towards the conclusion that „mixed‟ governance will be observed 
only in the presence of restrictions in the markets for ownership and control that prevent one 
set of interests or the other gaining legitimate superiority (for example, provisions such as 
those in the NZPHCS that limit the payment of government funding to firms with „mixed‟ 
control.  Furthermore, it cannot be discounted that the economically more efficient outcomes 
would not be achieved by the optimal ownership interests exerting effective control internally 
whilst masquerading externally as having „mixed control‟.  
3. Pre-NZPHCS Primary Health Care Ownership and Governance 
The paper now considers the case study of New Zealand and the observed patterns of 
ownership of primary health care delivery firms in New Zealand prior to and following the 
implementation of the NZPHCS. The NZPHCS was introduced to a mature primary health 
care sector comprising a variety of providers across the entire spectrum of owned, for-profit, 
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non-owned and nonprofit forms.  It would be expected that extant ownership interests and 
market transactions would have a significant effect upon the ways in which PHO ownership 
forms and governance arrangements have „emerged‟.  In particular, they would likely have a 
significant effect in determining both how PHOs formed, and whose interests – patients or 
providers - the balance of control of their governance functions of those PHOs would favour.     
 
3.1 Pre-NZPHCS: Supplier Co-operation 
Prior to the implementation of the NZPHCS in 2002 consistent with the theories of 
the combined costs of ownership and market contracting, General Practitioners (GPs) (the 
principal providers of primary health care in New Zealand) were mostly self-employed sole 
practitioners operating for-profit businesses. Fee-for-service government funding meant there 
were few financial risk-based reasons to merge practices.  Rigorous registration processes and 
disciplinary procedures overseen by the Government and Medical Association acted as a 
check on the quality of service providers entering and practising in the profession
15
.  Robust 
competition law, competition between practitioners for patients, and some government 
oversight of fees in respect to the co-payments made by those individuals qualifying for 
treatment subsidies, acted as a check on the ability of practitioners to charge prices 
substantially in excess of cost
16
.   
Whilst most GPs operated independent businesses, for the purposes of delivering 
health care, they were linked collectively via their membership of the New Zealand Medical 
Association (NZMA).  Furthermore, some collaborated via geographically distributed 
Independent Practitioner Associations (IPAs).  The IPAs in particular, had emerged in 
response to market-based reforms in the early 1990s for the purchasing and supply of all 
health care services, including primary health care.   
 
3.1.1 IPAs as Practitioner-Controlled Co-Operatives 
IPAs formed initially as geographically-based collectives of GPs working in supplier-
owned private practices, therefore GPs employed by government or non-GP owned entities 
such as consumer-owned co-operatives and nonprofit entities were not eligible for IPA 
membership. Each IPA is a legally distinct entity.  The legal forms of their incorporation vary 
with some having defined shareholdings, but all are characterised by having nonprofit 
                                                     
15 Similar processes also existed for other health professionals (e.g. nurses via the New Zealand Nurses‟ Organisation and 
midwives via the New Zealand College of Midwives). 
16Primary health care delivery, with repeat custom and sunk human capital costs, exhibits a pattern of monopolistic competition 
where individual preferences and high search costs mean that prices tend towards average rather than marginal cost, and are 
typically higher the more practitioners there are competing in a given geographic location, all else equal (Carlton & Perloff, 
2005).  
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objectives and control exercised ultimately by their controller-members.  As their 
predominant purpose was initially to provide services to their members, in essence they began 
as consumer-owned co-operatives.   
 IPAs were initially formed for the purpose of supplying to GPs those services which 
were costly to co-ordinate and self-provide at the level of an independent practice or small 
group practice. This included education, training, locum management and other services 
benefiting from scale economies.  GP members held the balance of power in governance 
arrangements in nonprofit IPAs. Membership was voluntary, and by no means did all 
practice-owning GPs join IPAs when they were initially formed in the 1980s.  Following 
health care reforms in the 1990s, many IPAs levered off their existing relationships with GPs 
in private practice to become vocal advocates for the interests of their members, and 
membership increased commensurate with an increase of the benefits to members from IPA 
activities.  By the implementation of the NZPHCS in 2002, 67% of GPs had joined IPAs 
(Controller and Auditor-General, 2002). 
Government policy changes in 1995 enabled government funds to be spent on a much 
wider range of services than the historic subsidies paid to GPs for classic primary health care 
consultations. As entities linking service providers, IPAs were ideally placed to devise new 
care delivery models and tender for the funding to operate these new services.  Classic 
economies of scope and scale meant that the ownership and contracting costs for IPAs to 
provide these services were lower than the counterfactual of establishing new entities for 
delivering equivalent services.  However, as the GP-members continued to deliver traditional 
services in their surgeries, the new services tendered for by IPAs tended to be complementary 
to the classic GP consultation. These included control of laboratory and pharmaceutical 
budgets accessed by their members; new programmes targeting sufferers of specific diseases 
(e.g. asthma, diabetes), immunisation programmes and school health services.   
New IPA-controlled services were typically provided by staff hired as employees 
specifically to operate the new programmes, rather than by IPA members as part of their 
membership of the co-operative.  Although some members did become IPA employees for 
specific programmes, they were generally contracted and remunerated separately for these 
activities, which they delivered in addition to their GP practice activities.  Profits generated 
from IPA-delivered services were applied to improve the services provided to GP members 
(e.g. increased education and training, development of computer systems for GP practices and 
linking practices to each other and the IPA electronically). Whilst the original advocacy and 
practice support activities continued to be provided to GP members as consumers , in respect 
of the new services IPAs morphed from being simple consumer-owned co-operatives serving 
GPs, to complex organisations embracing historic membership services and supplier-
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controlled co-operative arms contracting to sell services (via government contracts) to end 
consumers (patients). 
 The fiduciary duties specified for the governance of IPA-provided activities quite 
appropriately reflected the interests of the GP members as the nominal owners and controllers 
of the organisation, in respect of both the GP-as-consumer and GP/IPA-as-supplier activities.  
The IPA nonprofit objective had no demonstrable effect upon the identity of the controlling 
interest.   The interests of the final consumers of the services delivered by IPAs would not 
have been expected normally have entered into the governance arrangements of the firm, as 
they could quite reasonably have been addressed in the contract for sale and purchase of the 
services without any recourse to any additional governance obligations on the firm (Jensen, 
1991). The corollary is the governance arrangements of the GP-owned firms supplying 
services to patients.  Patients have no legitimate expectation of a governance role in those 
firms, so likewise were not expected to have a governance role in a firm which was in effect 
the collective manifestation of many such GPs „merged‟ notionally into a larger co-operative.   
If there were some additional costs of market contracting that indicated consumers would be 
more efficient owners of the firm, then resolution would have been achieved by consumers 
purchasing the IPA-firm, installing governors and fiduciary duties that reflect their interests 
and hiring the GPs as employees (or setting up a consumer-controlled firm to compete with 
the IPA-owned firm). However, this did not occur. 
That provider-controlled General Practices and IPAs dominated the supply of primary 
health care prior to the implementation of the NZPHCS (and no legal or regulatory 
prohibitions other than the preferences of government purchasers prevented competition from 
firms of alternative ownership) suggests that, all else held equal, there was no compelling 
economic justification for any other stakeholding interests to seek to acquire them.  
 
3.2 Consumer-Governed Models 
Despite the dominance of provider-controlled firms, consumer ownership of primary 
health care services also arose endogenously in New Zealand. Prior to the 1995 reforms that 
opened up new health care delivery options, consumer controlled firms emerged 
endogenously only in a limited number of circumstances.  These firms mainly served 
comparatively homogeneous consumers of health care services whose service preferences 
differed from those of the customers of supplier-controlled services.  The consumer-
controlled firms were most usually already organised co-operatively for the provision of other 
services. Examples include primary health care services owned by worker or student unions, 
where patients have similar life- and health-state conditions, and iwi health clinics where 
patients may favour care delivered according to specific cultural criteria that is not normally 
provided in the wider community of health care providers.   
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Whilst initially formed under a government funding arrangement that remunerated 
only GP services and staffed by salaried GPs, following the 1995 reforms, the consumer-
controlled firms began to expand both in number and in the range of services provided.  Iwi-
based services, leveraging off the economies of scale and scope present from the range of 
social and welfare activities already undertaken by these communities experienced the 
greatest growth.   Similar ventures arose around Pacific Island communities (often church-
based) and youth activity centres (Crampton, Davis & Lay-Yee, 2005).  The firms were either 
explicitly owned by the entities co-ordinating the consumer interests (albeit that some were 
themselves non-owned entities) or were strictly non-owned. In either case, the governance 
arrangements and fiduciary duties reflected the interests of their consumers as the 
economically logical owner-beneficiaries.   
An important subset of consumer-controlled firms has emerged as a consequence of 
the „missing market‟ for ownership of primary health care firms.  This is commonly seen in 
rural areas of New Zealand, where low population density and isolation discourage primary 
health care providers from wanting to practise in that community.  Typically, the organisation 
emerges when the existing practitioner (often of long standing) wishes to sell and cannot find 
a buyer for the business (e.g. upon retirement).  Rather than lose medical services altogether, 
community representatives assume responsibility for the co-ordination and provision of 
services. Whilst on the one hand, this may lead to „innovation‟, because often necessity opens 
up opportunities to create new ways of providing services (e.g. nurse clinics rather than GP 
clinics; use of new technologies to provide advice to patients in the absence of a physical 
practitioner; transport co-ordination to take patients to practitioners in other locations), on the 
other hand it is usually a second-best to having dedicated general practitioner services.  It is 
also a high-cost option, and the firm‟s future may also be uncertain due to the vagaries of 
charity revenue and historic reliance upon short-term funding contracts that militate against 
practitioners making a long-term commitment to the community.
17
   
 
4. Strategic Positioning under the NZPHCS 
The NZPHCS was introduced in 2002.  A key feature was a substantial increase in 
the amount of government funding applied to the sector.  In order to access increased 
government funding, primary health care practitioners were required to affiliate with new 
nonprofit PHOs.  Government funding was channelled to the PHOs through District Health 
Boards (DHBs); the latter were prohibited from contracting with for-profit organisations (for 
                                                     
17 These clinics could be staffed by employees, by GPs in a profit-sharing arrangement with their community or be leased as a 
rent-making function for the community.  
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primary health care) so that public monies "would not be diverted into dividends" (Minister of 
Health, 2001, p.14).   
By 2007, 80 PHOs had been established. PHOs were charged with either providing, 
or contracting for the supply of, primary health care services for enrolled populations. Each 
acts as an intermediary between the government funder (one of the 21 DHBs) on the one 
hand, and General Practitioners (GPs) and other primary health care providers on the other. 
As a result of factors such as their historical origins, the rapidity of the establishment of PHOs 
during the first 18 months of the NZPHCS, subtle differences in the demands the 21 funding 
DHBs placed on PHOs in their districts, and variations in the demographics and health needs 
of the patients enrolled in PHOs, a range of PHO legal forms emerged and are „tolerated‟ by 
the DHB funders.   
Figure 1:  Structure of New Zealand’s Primary Health Care System 
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health care services. PHO funding is based on the number of members (patients) enrolled 
either directly with the PHO or with the GPs who are contracted to the PHO.  Although GPs 
may themselves maintain independent for-profit practices with their own „patient lists‟, they 
must contract exclusively with only one PHO.  The institutional structure thus predisposes 
PHOs to operate in effect as a provider entity supplying services or ensuring the supply of 
services to its registered patients.   
As the NZPHCS was introduced into an environment where three distinct types of 
nonprofit entities – two consumer-controlled and one provider-controlled - had emerged 
endogenously, it is perhaps unsurprising that many different legal forms for PHOs have 
emerged.  It might be expected that the extant nonprofit entities would have a significant 
advantage in being able to quickly satisfy the non-ownership requirements in order to receive 
government primary health care monies.  However, the NZPHCS required PHOs to 
demonstrate both service provider and constituent community representation on their 
governing bodies.  As there was no evidence of „mixed governance‟ entities pre NZPHCS, 
meeting this obligation required PHOs emerging from provider-governed origins to include 
consumers in their governing bodies, and consumer-governed PHOs to include providers.   
  From the theories of ownership costs, mandating a „mixed governance‟ model most 
likely imposes substantial additional costs of ownership as a consequence of having to co-
ordinate the interests of an extremely heterogeneous set of stakeholders.  For example, as 
consumer-governors needed to be apprised of provider issues, and vice versa, it would take 
much longer to make decisions than under the counterfactual of respectively provider-
controlled and consumer-controlled firms
18
.  Furthermore, the dual governance model invokes 
the risk of capture of the firm‟s governance agenda by one set of interests at the expense of 
the other.  In that case, rather than the PHO being governed in the mutual interests of both its 
stakeholding groups, the PHO would likely operate as either a de facto supplier-controlled or 
consumer-controlled entity depending upon which interests were captured or engaged in the 
capturing. 
In practice, the competitive interactions emerging under the NZPHCS made speed of 
PHO formation the main imperative (Howell, 2005).  As community-controlled groups were 
almost always non-owned nonprofits, often with some (minority) provider representation 
already in place on their boards, migration to PHO status occurred quickly. Indeed, it would 
appear that the PHO governance arrangements had been modelled upon examples of 
community-governed organisations.   In order to avoid losing patients to newly-formed PHOs 
receiving higher levels of funding (a cost of market contracting), existing providers (namely 
independent GPs) faced very strong incentives to join or form their own PHO as soon as 
                                                     
18 Howell (2005) reports one PHO representative (service provider) noting that it took eighteen months for the consumer 
representatives on the board of his organisation to „get up to speed‟ on the issues facing providers in the sector.  
 -23-  
possible.  IPAs offered the logical vehicle via which to achieve this.  Consequently, most 
IPAs responded by forming „subsidiary‟ operations (often a charitable trust) where they 
continued to exercise supplier control by appointing board members (typically their members 
and staff such as nurses working for GP clinics) and determining the processes via which 
other representatives were appointed.  Appendix 1 shows that of the 77 PHOs in existence in 
2004 covering 95% of the population, 30 had their origins in community-led organisations 
and 47 emerged from practitioner-led initiatives.  The PHOs with community origins 
delivered services to 8.3% of the registered population.  Provider-origin PHOs covered the 
remaining 91.7%.     
Whilst in each case the governance arrangements „on paper‟ met the NZPHCS 
requirements for governance by mutual interests, in practice it would be surprising if the 
balance of governance interests of the PHOs were not in practice biased towards the interests 
of their originating stakeholders.   The case study in Howell (2005) of a large urban PHO 
indicates that this is essentially what occurred in one region, where to all intents and purposes 
the PHO was operating as a wholly-owned subsidiary of the IPA.  The IPA controlled the 
process by which community representatives were appointed. Moreover, a management 
company owned by this IPA was contracted to provide management services to five PHOs in 
adjoining geographic locations. In the 2003-4 financial year, the PHO had a board of eleven 
trustees. Six were general practitioners and directors of the IPA.  Two more were non-GPs 
whose appointment to the PHO was controlled by the IPA
19
.  The chair of the PHO was the 
chair of the IPA.  Clearly, the balance of governance control of this PHO lay squarely with 
the IPA. It is quite likely that the boards of other PHOs of IPA origin were similarly 
constituted. Cordery (2008) also recounts a similar situation in another region where the PHO 
was operated as a wholly-owned subsidiary of the IPA. The one PHO staff member was 
employed by the IPA, GPs contracted with the IPA which operated the PHO contract through 
the charitable PHO trust. Fiduciary duties were undertaken by those appointed by the IPA-
member GPs.  
5. Conclusion 
The case studies would appear to confirm that, despite the intentions articulated in the 
NZPHCS that governance of PHOs be shared between provider and consumer interests, 
effective control of the new entities has followed the service provider ownership interests 
prevailing prior to the implementation of the policy.  Provider interests appear to have 
dominated in the formation of PHOs covering over 90% of the population.  This would be 
expected given the extent to which provider interests controlled firms prior to the 
                                                     
19 The two directors concerned were to be practice nurses employed by IPA members.  
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implementation of the strategy. Consumer interests appear to have prevailed only in a 
minority of PHOs emerging from entities which, for a variety of endogenous economic 
reasons, were already consumer-controlled prior to the NZPHCS.  Whilst the policy might 
require evidence of mixed governance, it is quite likely that the underlying economic realities 
of the costs of ownership and market contracting biased the actual governance of these 
entities towards their original controlling interests.  As the absence of a defined ownership 
stake now precludes the „takeover‟ of control using ownership interests, unless there are 
significant changes in the external environment, the balance of locus of control interests are 
unlikely to alter substantially.     
We note however, that the case study analysis undertaken for this paper has provided 
only a snapshot of the new entities based upon secondary data and relates to the formation of 
PHOs and not current practices. Consequently, further research is indicated in two 
dimensions.  The first is to investigate whether the balance of control by either consumer or 
provider interests indicated by the secondary data at the time of PHO formation is reflected in 
the nature of decisionmaking processes actually undertaken by the governing bodies.  The 
second is to investigate whether the effect of recent PHO amalgamation, partly in response to 
policy directives as a consequence of the burgeoning costs of PHO operation, has altered the 
balance of effective control of PHOs between provider and consumer interests.   
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Appendix 1.  PHO Origins 2003-4. 
 
Consumer Origins 
 
Enrolled  
 
 
Population 
Hauora Hokianga Integrated PHO 
 
6,633 
Kaipara Care Incorporated 
 
12,008 
Tihewa Mauriora Charitable Trust 
 
8,729 
Wangaroa Primary Health Organisation 
 
318 
AuckPAC Health Trust Board 
 
30,044 
Langimalie Health Clinic Tongan  
 
6,039 
Tipaka Moana PHO Trust 
 
6,523 
Coast to Coast PHO (North Rodney) 
 
11,910 
Mangere Community Health Trust 
 
11,827 
Peoples Healthcare Trust 
 
5,935 
TaPasefika Health Trust 
 
18,768 
Te Kupenga O Hoturoa Charitable Trust 
 
19,364 
Hauraki PHO 
 
7,199 
Maori Primary Health Organisation Coalition 
 
7,328 
North Waikato PHO 
 
8,878 
Nga Mataapuna Oranga 
 
8,685 
Te Ao Hou Primary health Organisation 
 
7,176 
Ngati Porou Hauora Incorporated 
 
12,579 
Te Kupenga A Kahu Trust 
 
6,870 
Wairoa District Charitable Health Trust 
 
8,630 
Te Tihi Hauora o Taranaki 
 
6,140 
Taumata Hauora Trust 
 
5,492 
Otaki Primary Health Organisation Trust 
 
5,975 
Tararua PHO Limited 
 
15,882 
Porirua Health Plus Limited 
 
12,857 
South East & City Primary Health Organisation 
 
9,543 
Piki te Ora ki Te Awakairangi 
 
12,248 
Ropata Community PHO 
 
16,186 
Tamati Whangai PHO 
 
4,563 
Hurunui Kaikoura Primary Health Organisation 
 
12,278 
Total 
       
    306,607 
 
 
 
Producer Origins 
 
 
Manaia Health PHO 
 
74,244 
Te Tai Tokerau PHO Ltd 
 
41,468 
Auckland PHO Ltd 
 
15,636 
Procare Network Auckland Ltd 
 
305,674 
Tamaki HealthCare Charitable Trust 
 
31,023 
HealthWest 
 
149,365 
North Harbour PHO Trust 
 
149,797 
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Procare Network North Limited 
 
88,540 
East Health Trust 
 
69,851 
Waiora Healthcare Trust 
 
10,652 
Procare Network Manukau Limited 
 
260,039 
Total Healthcare Otara 
 
74,827 
Pinnacle 
 
286,401 
Kawerau Interim Primary Health Organisation 
 
7,208 
Eastern Bay of Plenty PHO Ltd 
 
31,463 
Western Bay of Plenty Primary Health Organisation 
 
125,836 
Turanganui PHO Limited 
 
33,500 
Lake Taupo PHO Ltd 
 
33,821 
Rotorua General Practice Group Ltd 
 
66,401 
Hawkes Bay PHO Ltd 
 
131,336 
Pinnacle Incorporated 
 
47,371 
Taranaki PHO Ltd 
 
45,770 
Whanganui Regional PHO 
 
47,760 
Horowhenua PHO Ltd 
 
23,843 
Capital PHO 
 
127,559 
Kapiti PHO 
 
33,219 
Karori PHO Trust 
 
12,668 
Tumai mo te Iwi Inc 
 
45,056 
MidValley Access PHO 
 
20,319 
Valley Primary Health Organisation 
 
76,953 
Wairarapa Community PHO Trust 
 
37,159 
Marlborough PHO Ltd (Nelson Bays Primary Health) 
 
38,379 
Nelson-Tasman PHO Ltd 
 
86,577 
West Coast PHO 
 
25,396 
Canterbury Community PHO 
 
5,082 
Partnership Health Canterbury 
 
332,828 
Rural Canterbury PHO 
 
74,910 
South Canterbury PHO Limited (Aoraki PHO Ltd) 
 
53,802 
Mornington Primary Health Organisation 
 
14,595 
Central Otago PHO Ltd (Rural Otago PHO) 
 
37,837 
Dunedin City PHO Ltd 
 
79,065 
Eastern and Northern Southland PHO 
 
16,920 
Waihopai PHO Limited (Invercargill - Te Ara A Kewa PHO) 
 
59,336 
Otago Southern Regional Primary Health Organisation 
 
17,561 
Taieri and Strath Taieri Primary Health Organisation 
 
13,859 
Rural Southland PHO Limited (Takitimu PHO) 
 
13,922 
Wakatipu PHO 
 
11,644 
Total 
 
  3,386,472 
 
 
Source: Ministry of Health http://www.moh.govt.nz/moh.nsf/wpg_index/-Primary+Health+Care+Established+PHOS  
and Ministry of Health (2005). 
 
